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SUMMARY

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2. South Korea urges bilateral defense pact with US:

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South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun has strongly urged that the US Government enter into a bilateral defense pact with Korea. Ambassador Briggs suggests

that such a pact may be a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of South Korean opposition to an armistice.

Comment: This is the first suggestion that the South Korean Government might agree to an armistice which would leave Korea divided. During the past week, South Korean legislative and executive officials have expressed opposition to an armistice as currently contemplated by the UN.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Comment on effect of release of Moscow doctors on the Arabs and Israel:

The Soviet announcement that the charges against the "Moscow doctors" are being dropped immediately raises hopes in Tel Aviv and causes apprehension in Arab capitals.

Israel, deeply distressed over the Soviet-initiated break, can now indulge in cautious optimism that formal diplomatic relations may be restored. Even more important to Zionism is the renewal of the hope that Moscow may some day permit Tel Aviv to continue the "ingathering of the exiles." The hope of a re-establishment of relations with Moscow in turn offers the Ben-Gurion government the possibility of returning to its position of nominal neutrality, thus affording more scope for maneuvering in international relations.

An improvement in Israeli-Soviet relations, however, would immediately create more internal problems for the Israeli Government. Leftists and Communist political groups now quiescent would reassert themselves and resume their traditional role.

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The Arabs, who have viewed the Soviet-Israeli break with cautious satisfaction, will see in the Moscow announcement a hint of Soviet-Israeli rapprochement. They will fear that a release by the Orbit of part of its 2,500,000 Jews will result in new Israeli territorial aspirations.

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